CommonSpace columnist Gary Elliot says more critical thinking around why Scotland’s first referendum on independence was lost is required before getting too caught up in talk of an indyref 2
EVERY organisation needs to take time to embark on critical self-analysis after it has been involved in activity. It doesn’t matter if it is a public or private sector organisation, a local committee, a sports team, whatever.
When you have completed some sort of planned activity, project, competition or venture you need to look back and pose questions such as; how did we do? Did our plans work out as expected or fall flat? What worked well? What didn’t work well? What happened that we didn’t expect? What can we do better next time?
I have concerns over the extent to which the independence campaign has done this post-referendum and there are two major factors that stick out.
The SNP – not the only party but certainly a major part of the campaign – went quickly from the referendum, to choosing a new leader, to selecting candidates for Westminster and subsequently fighting that election.
Firstly, the official Yes campaign wound down fairly quickly after the event. I have no idea the extent to which this critical analysis was or wasn’t carried out. However, even if it was, it is difficult to see how the results of any analysis can effectively be carried forward into any new future organisation.
Secondly, the SNP – not the only party but certainly a major part of the campaign – went quickly from the referendum, to choosing a new leader, to selecting candidates for Westminster and subsequently fighting that election.
It feels as if the party just hasn’t had the time to engage in the type of reasoned, in-depth self-reflection that is required. If it has happened within the party then it hasn’t involved the grass roots and if the process has happened at all the results certainly haven’t been fed down.
There are positives to take from the campaign. Support for independence grew while support for the union fell. Yes ran a positive and engaging campaign and engendered a heightened level of political engagement.
There were shortcomings as well. Iain MacWhirter wrote a piece during the campaign in which he voiced his frustration at the inability of the Yes campaign to rebut the scaremongering of Better Together in the media.
He contrasted the approach of Yes to that of Labour in the run up to 1997. During that campaign Labour had long planned a “rebuttal unit”. It had recognised that the Tory-leaning press would act as a facilitator of Tory attacks and set out to rebut these before they had the chance to run a 24-hour news cycle.
The frustrating thing about the Yes campaign was that this wasn’t happening through the official campaign but through the unofficial movement, particularly online with the most effective example being Wings Over Scotland.
It feels as if the party just hasn’t had the time to engage in the type of reasoned, in-depth self-reflection that is required.
The problem with this of course was that Wings wasn’t reaching the people who got their news via mainstream television and mainstream press. The ‘Wee Blue Book’ helped, but it wasn’t a rebuttal device as such.
Also, was I the only person who thought that the Yes campaign’s billboard campaign was weak? Sorry, but the big ‘Scotland’s Future in Scotland’s Hands’ poster just seemed too schmaltzy and vacuous for the importance of the decision that we were asking people to take.
The SNP was criticised during the campaign for the lack of ambition within the White Paper. Although I felt some of the criticism of the White Paper was unwarranted, recent events have shown some of it to be true.
For example, the SNP had a bolder minimum wage offer heading in to the 2015 UK General Election than within the White Paper. Even George Osborne has ended up having a stronger minimum wage offer than within the White Paper.
There has also been a real lack of reflection and realism of many individuals who took part the campaign. As Alex Massie critiqued, a YouGov poll showed that 56 per cent of SNP voters didn’t believe that the fall in oil prices would affect an independent Scotland in an adverse way.
Although, in my opinion, current oil prices aren’t an absolute barrier to independence, you can’t fail to face up to the challenges that they bring, both in terms of managing the economy and in selling the offer to the voters.
Is the pro-independence movement ready to go into indyref 2? It doesn’t feel like it to me and although I have previously explored possible paths to indyref 2 , it’s why the current talk about the next referendum leaves me slightly uneasy.
This lack of critical analysis also seems to mirror lack of perspective within the Yes movement in relation to where Scotland might stand fiscally and economically within the next few years.
In the run up to indyref 1 Scotland was arguably in a stronger fiscal position than the UK as a whole. If we are looking at indyref 2 within the next five years it is particularly unclear where Scotland’s oil revenues will be and whether these will push Scotland into a fiscal position that is weaker than the UK as a whole.
This lack of critical analysis also seems to mirror lack of perspective within the Yes movement in relation to where Scotland might stand fiscally and economically within the next few years.
Indeed, some projections have suggested that there may be a point where the UK effectively eradicates the deficit but Scotland continues to have a working deficit. That’s potentially a far harder sell to the voting public than we had in the lead up to 2014.
It isn’t insurmountable, but, to carry the day, any future Yes campaign would have to have a deficit reduction programme that would be detailed, costed, economically credible but also understandable to the voting public.
And in my opinion that is true whether you view that plan to be via Keynesian demand management or through fiscal conservatism.
There is a school of thought that the SNP never expected to win a majority at Holyrood and thus never expected to have to fight a referendum. Whether there is any truth in that or not, it is not an accusation that can be considered in relation to indyref 2.
If it is going to happen the weaknesses of indyref 1 need to be addressed, the strategic and scenario planning needs to begin for indyref 2 now and the strengths that were discovered as the campaign developed need to be built upon.
If that doesn’t happen indyref 2 will be lost and if that happens – in my opinion – the gemmes a bogey for an independent Scotland.
Oh and as I’ve said before, we need a credible currency policy as well…
Picture courtesy of Tom Parnell